Testing hypotheses about the harm that capitalism causes to the mind and brain: a theoretical framework for neuroscience research.

In this paper, we will attempt to outline the key ideas of a theoretical framework for neuroscience research that reflects critically on the neoliberal capitalist context. We argue that neuroscience can and should illuminate the effects of neoliberal capitalism on the brains and minds of the population living under such socioeconomic systems. Firstly, we review the available empirical research indicating that the socio-economic environment is harmful to minds and brains. We, then, describe the effects of the capitalist context on neuroscience itself by presenting how it has been influenced historically. In order to set out a theoretical framework that can generate neuroscientific hypotheses with regards to the effects of the capitalist context on brains and minds, we suggest a categorization of the effects, namely deprivation, isolation and intersectional effects. We also argue in favor of a neurodiversity perspective [as opposed to the dominant model of conceptualizing neural (mal-)functioning] and for a perspective that takes into account brain plasticity and potential for change and adaptation. Lastly, we discuss the specific needs for future research as well as a frame for post-capitalist research.

How representative are neuroimaging samples? Large-scale evidence for trait anxiety differences between fMRI and behaviour-only research participants.

Over the past three decades, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has become crucial to study how cognitive processes are implemented in the human brain. However, the question of whether participants recruited into fMRI studies differ from participants recruited into other study contexts has received little to no attention. This is particularly pertinent when effects fail to generalize across study contexts: for example, a behavioural effect discovered in a non-imaging context not replicating in a neuroimaging environment. Here, we tested the hypothesis, motivated by preliminary findings (N = 272), that fMRI participants differ from behaviour-only participants on one fundamental individual difference variable: trait anxiety. Analysing trait anxiety scores and possible confounding variables from healthy volunteers across multiple institutions (N = 3317), we found robust support for lower trait anxiety in fMRI study participants, consistent with a sampling or self-selection bias. The bias was larger in studies that relied on phone screening (compared with full in-person psychiatric screening), recruited at least partly from convenience samples (compared with community samples), and in pharmacology studies. Our findings highlight the need for surveying trait anxiety at recruitment and for appropriate screening procedures or sampling strategies to mitigate this bias.

Does overloading cognitive resources mimic the impact of anxiety on temporal cognition?

Anxiety alters how we perceive the world and can alter aspects of cognitive performance. Prominent theories of anxiety suggest that the effect of anxiety on cognition is due to anxious thoughts "overloading" limited cognitive resources, competing with other processes. If this is so, then a cognitive load manipulation should impact performance of a task in the same way as induced anxiety. Thus, we examined the impact of a load manipulation on a time perception task that we have previously shown to be reliably impacted by anxiety. In contrast with our prediction, across 3 studies we found that time perception was insensitive to our load manipulation. Our results do not therefore support the idea that anxiety impacts temporal cognition by overloading limited cognitive resources, at least as induced by a commonly used load manipulation. Thus, anxiety might affect temporal cognition in a unique way, via an evolutionary-preserved defense survival system, as suggested by animal-inspired theories of anxiety, rather than competing for limited attentional resources. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Anxiety makes time pass quicker while fear has no effect.

People often say that during unpleasant events, e.g. traumatic incidents such as car accidents, time slows down (i.e. time is overestimated). However aversive events can elicit at least two dissociable subtypes of reactions: fear (transient and relating to an imminent event) and anxiety (diffuse and relating to an unpredictable event). We hypothesised that anxiety might have an opposite effect on time perception compared to fear. To test this we combined a robust anxiety manipulation (threat-of-shock) with a widely used timing task in which participants judged whether the duration of a stimulus was long or short. In line with our hypothesis, across three experiments (with varying stimulus timings and shock levels), participants significantly underestimated time under inducted anxiety, as indicated by a rightward shift of the psychophysical function (meta-analytic effect size: d = 0.68, 95% confidence interval: 0.42-0.94). In two further studies, we were unable to replicate previous findings that fear leads to time overestimation, after adapting our temporal cognition task, which suggests a dissociation between fear and anxiety on how they affect time perception. Our results suggest that experimentally inducing anxiety leads to underestimating the duration of temporal intervals, which might be a starting point in explaining different subjective experiences of disorders related to fear (e.g. post-traumatic stress disorder) and anxiety (e.g. generalised anxiety disorder).

Developmental and individual differences in the precision of visuospatial memory.

Our ability to retain visuospatial information over brief periods of time is severely limited and develops gradually. In childhood, visuospatial short-term and working memory are typically indexed using span-based measures. However, whilst these standardized measures have been successful in characterizing developmental and individual differences, each individual trial only provides a binary measure of a child's performance-they are either correct or incorrect. Here we used a novel continuous report paradigm, in combination with probabilistic modeling, to explore developmental and individual differences in how likely children were to recall memoranda, and how precisely they could report them. Taking this approach revealed a number of novel findings: (i) a concurrent processing demand negatively impacted upon both of these parameters, increasing the guessing rate and making children less precise; (ii) older children (aged 10-12, N = 20) were significantly less likely to guess, but when they did remember the target were no more precise in reporting it than younger children (aged 7-9, N = 20); (iii) children's performance on standardized short-term and working memory tasks was significantly associated with both the guessing likelihood, and the precision of target responding, on the continuous report task. In short, we show that continuous report paradigms can offer interesting insight into processes that underlie developmental and individual differences in visuospatial memory in childhood.

Cortical activity is more stable when sensory stimuli are consciously perceived.

According to recent evidence, stimulus-tuned neurons in the cerebral cortex exhibit reduced variability in firing rate across trials, after the onset of a stimulus. However, in order for a reduction in variability to be directly relevant to perception and behavior, it must be realized within trial--the pattern of activity must be relatively stable. Stability is characteristic of decision states in recurrent attractor networks, and its possible relevance to conscious perception has been suggested by theorists. However, it is difficult to measure on the within-trial time scales and broadly distributed spatial scales relevant to perception. We recorded simultaneous magneto- and electroencephalography (MEG and EEG) data while subjects observed threshold-level visual stimuli. Pattern-similarity analyses applied to the data from MEG gradiometers uncovered a pronounced decrease in variability across trials after stimulus onset, consistent with previous single-unit data. This was followed by a significant divergence in variability depending upon subjective report (seen/unseen), with seen trials exhibiting less variability. Applying the same analysis across time, within trial, we found that the latter effect coincided in time with a difference in the stability of the pattern of activity. Stability alone could be used to classify data from individual trials as "seen" or "unseen." The same metric applied to EEG data from patients with disorders of consciousness exposed to auditory stimuli diverged parametrically according to clinically diagnosed level of consciousness. Differences in signal strength could not account for these results. Conscious perception may involve the transient stabilization of distributed cortical networks, corresponding to a global brain-scale decision.